Introduction
Since 1919. the n1ajor source of in tern at ional labour standards has been the conventions and recon1n1endations of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) together with the interpretative rulings issued by the supervisory bodies established by that organisation. Indeed so ignificant is this body of international standards that it i often referred to as an international lahour code (Valticos. 1979 p. 46) . These standards have also been cornplimented by instrurnents adopted by other international agencies. notably the United Nations.' but also regional agencies such as the Council of Europe and the League of Arah States.
The ILO conventions are. however. the tnost itnportant of these instruments because of their world wide application. their sok focus on labour and industrial relations and because they are adopted in the expectation that they will influence the law and ptactice of n1ernber countries to conforn1 to the standards set. The ILO is unique in several aspects. Arnong international organisations the 1LO alone is a tripartite organisation and thus its deci~ions represent not only the position of governrnents but also of en1p1oyer and worker delegates. Valticos (1979. p.?9) suggests that the tripartite structure .. has heen an undeniable source of vigour··. it avoids decision being taken in a purely technocratic spirit and give~ increased authority to ILO decisions.
Since 1919. the ILÕ had adopted 161 conventions although a reasonable proportion of these are revisions of earlier conventions.
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Of these. New Zealand has ratified 5i' although ) of these have been recently denounced. This nun1ber of ratifications is reasonably high and cornpares favourably with an average of 56 ratifications for V..'e t European countries. e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) : International Covenants on Economic. Social and Cultu ra I Rights ( 1966) and the I nternationa I Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 1966) . the n1ore significant of these as they are intended to be formally ratified by member countries. such countries then assurning formal responsibilities to ensure that national law and practice confirn1s to the convention. To attain the maximum number of ratifications. conventions generally impose only broad n1inimum standards and attempt to achieve maximum flexibility so as to n1eet the different social and economic conditions in member countries. Recommendations. on the other hand. are intended only as a guide to practice and policy and do not involve forn1allegal obligations. There are 166 recommendations at present. For this reason they can be used for a variety of purposes for which a convention may not be suitable. These include providing more detailed and higher standards than may be possible in a convention or providing standards in an area where a convention is not presently possible.
In the case of both conventions and recommendations. member governments of the ILO have an obligation to place the instruments before the competent authority (in New Zealand this is Parlian1ent) and to state the action they propose to take in respect of the instrument. Such action must also be notified to the Director-General of the ILO. New Zealand governments perfonn this requirement through Parliamentary Papers A7 and A7 A. Member countries are also obliged to supply reports on unratified conventions and on recommendations when required. Generally. the ILO Governing Body requires reports on one or more instruments each year. These reports are examined by supervisory bodies.
Ratification of a convention. however. is a formal act by which a state assumes specific legal obligations in respect of the convention. most important of which is the obligation to take such action as n1ay he necessary to make the provisions of the convention effective. Generally these measures are permitted to be flexible and include collective bargaining or similar rneasures in addition to legislative action. Once ratified. a convention comes into force after 12 months and n1ay only be denounced after a period of 10 years and thereafter only at the end of subsequent I 0-yearly periods. Ratification also involves the acceptance of an obligation to provide periodic reports on the measures taken to give effect to the convention and of the possibility of having to answer complaints regarding its observance of a convention . The major supervisory body. the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. consists of persons appointed in their personal capacity and is independent of governments. Freedom of association complaints are dealt with by a separate body. the Committee on Freedom of Association. The decisions of these bodies represent a significant body of law on the application and interpretation of the various conventions.
• It should also he noted that. unlike many international instruments. an ILO convention·s ratification cannot he n1ade subject to reservations. Consequently ratification may be made more difficult as particular articles which cause problems cannot he avoided even for legitimate reasons.
The New Zealand approach to ratification
The official New Zealand arproach to ratifying ILO conventions has often been stated in its reports on proposed action: This is: .. Because of the obligations incumbent on ratifying countries. New Zealand ratifies a convention only when there is strict compliance of law and practice with all the provisions of the particular Convention ... This approach does. however. cause some problems because of the manner in which compliance with a convention is pern1itted. An art ide such as: .. Effect may he given to this Convention through national laws or regulations or collective agreements. or in any other manner consistent with national practice .. (Convention 135. Article 6) is typical ofiLO con'fentions. The dilemma is. of course. that irnplen1cntation by voluntary procedures such as collective bargaining means that it is difficult for a n1en1her state to ensure total compliance. But it is also inconsistent with a system of collective bargaining for the governn1ent to dictate the terms of a collective agreement.
That the New Zealand government is aware of this problem can be seen in its response to Convention 144 (on tripartite consultation to pron1ote the implementation ofiLO standards) -a rnost appropriate context in which to make the remarks. The response included the sta tenH?n t that: Nev. Zealand has ~tated in comments to the ILO that it is con~itkred that the subject ma ttcr is not one'' h ich is su itcd to an i nst rumen 1 in the form of a Con vent ion. si nee in our view a Convention is appropriate for topics which require the enactment of lcgblation or Gov~rnmcnl dir~ction or supervision. \Ve believe that this particular matter i one in which co-ope1ation from employers· and worker· organisations cannot be cnfon:ed. but is to be given voluntarily. and therefore cannot be ensured through legislative or other directive measures. As , com pi iH nee \\it h the Convent ion would he dependent u pan such cooperation. compliance also cannot he ensured. (AJHR 1975. Paper A7A. p.4) .
Thi approach to ratification would scern to tnean lhal New Zealand n1ay he unable to ratify a convention that requires tripartite co-operation unless univer al or virtually universal agreetnent can be achieved. One consequence is likely to be that only technical conventions \Viii be ratified as norrnaHy they can be irnplen1ented hy governn1ent action alone. Those cotnentions that have broader in1plications and affect the indu trial relations systern generally are n1ore likely to require tripartite co-operalion and consequently will not be ratified. The conventions to be discussed in this paper are altnost all of this type in that they lay down basic principles of industrial relations conduct and their effectivenes -depends on tripartite in1plen1entation.
The New Zealand goven11nent approach is. it can he suggested. unduly conservntive. The ILO constitution docs not require conforrnity prior to ratification and the ver)' nature of ILO conventions envisages impkrnentation hy rneans other than government action. Ohviously ratification where in1ple1nentation i unlikely. is not desirable. but in the case of conventions to be in1plen1ented by non-governrnental 1neasures. ratification should be acceptable where there is substantial cornpliance. Indeed ratification in such cases should help ensure full con1pliance especially if the decision to ratify is taken afler consultation an1ong all 3 parties. Moreover. given the tripartite n1e1nber hip oft he ILO. it can he strongly argued lhat there is an obligation on both employers and unions to take positive steps to enable ralification. To do otherwise is to avoid respon ~jbility and to undermine the ILO systen1 of tripartite decision making.
While ratification does not directly affect don1estic law. · which rnust he changed through norn1al processes. it n1ay have an inlluence on judicial decisions. Cooke. J in Van Gorkon v Artorney Gl!nera/11977] in relation to the United Nations l)eclaration of Hun1an Rights. said .. They rnay he regarded as reprcscn ti ng a kgisla ti ve policy urh ich 111 igh tin n uencc the courts in the in te rprcta tion of statute h1 w:· his suggested here that the Governn1ent should revie\v its policy towards ratification to see if it is po sible to ratify the major h u nHt n rights and indus tria 1 relet tions conventions without the need for prior tot a I corn pi ia nee.
Conventions relevant to the Green Paper ILO conventions cover a rnultiplicity of subjects. n1any either technical or confined to specific classes of worker. Only a limited nurnber atte1npt to lay clown general standards for the conduct of industrial relations and the rights and obligations of unions and en1ployers . The most irnportant of these which relate to the Green Paper(which cover only private sector arrangen1ents) are: ( l) Convention 87 : freedon1 of association and protection of the right to organise ( 1948) (2} Convention 98: applicability of the principles of the right to organise and to hargain collectively ( 1949) (3) Convention 135: protection and facilities lo he afforded to workers repre entatives in the undertaking ( 1971) (4) Convention 154: pron1otion of collective bargaining (1981) .
While these conventions have the broadest in1pliction ~.there are other conventions that arc relevant to the Green Paper's review uch as Convention 158 on tern1i nation of en1ployn1ent at the initialive of the en1ployer (19R2) . \vhich should also be considered by goven11nent and others. New Zealand has not ratified any of the above conventions.
The following discussion relates only to the conventions as they apply to private sector arrangements and it does not extend to the rccornn1endations that accon1pany Conventions 135 and 154. Should it be decided that rnore po~itive steps he taken to irnplen1ent the ILO standards hoth these rnatters would require attention. l'v1oreover the discussion focuses only on the rna in features of the conventions and the prohlcn1s theiritnpk1ncntation would pose. A Gordon Anderson detailed discussion would be both complex and beyond the scope of this paper which is concerned to highlight the problems. not to resolve them in detail. . Such a move seen1s to he somewhat hesitant as the words .. where reasonable .. are used. but it is nevertheless to he welcomed. While it would be untrue to argue that the failure to ratify is due to a lack of acceptance of the convention ·s principles. the failure to ratify does allow the conventions principles to he avoided if convenient for political motives. The Green Paper points out that the failure to ratify meant that no action could be taken in respect of a corn plaint upheld by the Con1mittee on Freedom of Association relating to the provisions of the Fishing Industry (Union Coverage) Act 1979 (Department of Labour. 1985 I p. [38] [39] .
That the present Governn1ent is totally committed to the convention may also be doubted if deregistration threats are made seriously.x Convention R7 has received n1uch attention in New Zealand during the debate on union n1ernhership. a topic that is excluded from the review in any meaningful sense (Department of Labour. 19R4. I p. 11-12). Union security clauses are. however. not the central feature of Convention X7. and its in1plen1entation raises much wider issues (see Anderson and Brosnan.
19X4 ).
In sun1n1ary Convention X7 guarantees 4 basic freedon1s to workers and employers. These are: The right to organise requires that workers should be able to establish and join organisations of their own choosing. This choice may. in practice. be restricted by the unions themselves but what is important is that it must not be restricted by the state. either directly or tl The others relate to forl·cd labour (No's 29 and 105) and discrimination (No. Ill).
7 While the discussion in this part centres on unions much of it also applies to employer bodies. ... where the rights conferred on a registered trade union under an optional system are of uch fundamental importance that any organisation deprived of them would have serious difficulty in furthering and defending the interesb of its members. the considerations . .. concerning the right to establi h organisations "without previous authorisation .. are as relevant as in cases in which registration or other formalities are compul ory. (ILO. 1975. p.12) Any move to ratification rnust. it seen1s. resu lt in a tnajor cha nge in the protected status of registered unions. This need not. however. involve a policy of total access to the conciliation and arbitration systen1. The Con11nittee has accepted the notion of a .. n1ost representative .. union as long as this does not deprive other union~ of the .. essential n1eans .. of their functioning. The Cornmittee's position . is that:
Anicle 3. paragraph 5. of the Con titution of the ILO states the concepts of "mo~t rcpresenative" organisations. Accordingly the Committee felt that the mere fact that the law of a country draw~ a distinction between the most representative trade union organisations and other trade union organi at ion · is not in itself a matter forcritici~m. provided that such distinction does not accord to the most representative organisation privileges extending beyond the privilege of priority. on the ground of its having the largest memher hip. in representation for such purpose~ as collective bargaining or con ultation hy go\ernments or for the purpose of nominating dekgates to international bodies. In other words. thi~ distinction should not have the effect of depriving trade union organisations not rccogni~cd as heing among the most rt>presentative oft he essential mc<111:-. \\hereby they may defend the occupational intere ts of their members. organise their admini~tration and activitie~ and formulate their programmes. as provided for in Convention No. S7 (para. ~9).
That provisions n1ay exist to prevent a n1ultiplicity of trade unions has also been recognised hy the ILO Con1111inee of Experts (ILO. 1975. p. 17) . Again the need for objective criteria to detenn i ne the 111ajori ty union is stressed as is the need to penni t at least rn in i n1 al talus to other unions. For New Zealand law to n1eet this interpretation it would seen1 that at least the following changes would be required: (l) The provisions relating to the legal personality of unions and their constitution needs to be separated fron1 the provisions relating to access to the co nciliation and arbitration syste n1. (2) The criteria for access and the extent of the privileges granted need to be redefined in tenns of a n1ost representative union rather than the present systen1 of the lirst union to register gaining virtually unchallengeable privileges. This can best be achieved by a separate statute (e.g. a new Trade Unions Act) or by a new part of the 1 ndustrial Relations Act \Vh ich would he appropriate for the incorporation of all unions and which was drafted \\'ith unions specifically in mind. Such an approach \\'ould also enable a simple solution to problems posed by Articles 3 -5 of the convention to be achieved (see belO\\').
Such a provision need cover only the incorporation and constitutional requircn1ents of unions. That is corporate status. powers and any necessary requiretnents relating to internal governn1ent and n1anagen1etH that arc con1patible with the convention.
The nature of a n1ost representative union has been considered by the Co1ntnittee which has suggested a nun1ber of safeguards (para. 30). These are: (l) certification to be by an independent body. Gordon Anderson (2) the representative organisation to be chosen by a majority vote of the employees in the unit concerned. (3) the right of an organisation which fails to secure sufficient votes to ask for a new election after a stipulated period. (4) the right of an organisation other than the certified organisation to demand a new election after a fixed period.
These safeguards are not exhaustive but are a suggested minimum. It should also be noted that the Committee does not define the appropriate bargaining unit. It would seem that. within broad safeguards. the bargaining unit and the nature of the most representative union can be defined according to national conditions. The question must therefore be asked: What are the most appropriate arrangements that would be feasible in New Zealand? The answer would reasonably be those that fit most easily within the present structures and institutions. It should be possible. with appropriate modifications. to use the present basis of industry-district registration as the basic unit for the most representative union and grant the privileges accordingly. In most cases this would be unlikely to result in any short-terrn changes in union organisation and even in the longer term it is likely that agreements within the union n1ovement would limit dramatic change. A transitional period where the present union was designated the most representative would ease the process of change considerably.
While dran1atic changes would seem unlikely with a mature union movement. such a revision of the law would involve a marked departure from the present arrangements. As a n1inin1un1. existing unions would need to be prepared for other competing unions to operate within their hitherto exclusive preserve. even if only to represent the interests of their own members on a restricted basis. On a more fundan1entallevel. the possibility must exist of a challenge to a union ·s position and its representative capacity. A well organised and democratic union. responsive to members· needs. should however. have little to fear from such arrangements.
The union n1oven1ent is in essence left with a choice between its present protected position and a more uncertain position but which gives much stronger guarantees (and international sanctions) to the concept of freedom of association. For a developed union movement the latter option has considerable advantages especially in the light of potential future political developments. The structure of trade unionism in New Zealand has. and in many respects continues to be. seen as a n1atter for possible political manipulation. Suggestions that unions be reorganised on a"plant basis. a reorganisation of major significance. is one manifestation of this. The essence of Convention 87 is that union organisation is a matter for workers and their organisations. not en1ployers or governments.
The right to control their own affairs
Within present industrial law. New Zealand unions face 3 major impediments to controlling their own affairs: (I) the ultra vires rule: (2) the controls on the membership rules.
(3) the prescriptions on the contents and structure of the union rulebook. Of these. the first 2 are the rnost significant.
In a line of cases beginning in 1913. the courts have taken a particularly restrictive view of the ultra vires doctrine in relation to trade unions (see Mathieson. 1970 pp. 218-228) .1n essence.
registered unions have been held to have no powers beyond those set out in section 163. i.e. "protect or further the interests of workers engaged in any specified industry:· and then possibly only in relation to "industrial matters .. as defined in section 2. a section that has been narrowly construed (Anderson. 1979. pp. 3-17) . It has. for example. been held that unions have no power to be involved in welfare activities or to amalgatnate with organisations outside their own industry. interpretations that would seem totally incompatible with article 3 (and also with real life). The ultra vires rule has also been used by the Registrar to justify a refusal to accept ntle changes that widen union activities (Department of Labour. 1985. II pp. 41-42). The Green Paper acknowledges these problems (Department of Labour. 1985. II pp. 52-56) and particularly the narrow scope of the ultra vires rule which it seems to imply could be widened.
These problems are. however. relatively easy to overcome given the political will. If the suggestion n1ade a hove of having a new system of union incorporation was adopted it would he relatively si1nple to include a section defining union powers in a broad manner (cf. Cornpanics Act )<.)55. section 15A) lea\ing the union it elf to decide appropriate limitation~. The second problem. restriclions on mcrnhership clauses. could <~gain he overco1n~. at least legally. hy simply allowing unions to incorporate with uch con'litutions as the) sec fit within broad parameters set by the legislation. Such an approach \\otdd. hoWC\CI'. require a major attitudinal change hy the unions. ~tlthough ~tgain it could he (tnticipctted that internal union processes would rcstrkt the possibility of 1najor disruption.
Finally. some attention would need to be given to the controls on internal organi ati()n of u n io 11 s in the Act. 1 nso 1' <1 r <ISs uc h provision~ are designed toe nsu rc tkrnocra tic control and to protect mem hers rights (such as Part X Ill on election i rregula ri tics) or their funds (section 1 R4 on ~ICCOl111ts and audits) lhey arc recognised as acceptable. It is only if the controls go beyond this that prohlen1s arise. \Vhere controls and safeguards are prescribed it is. hO\\ever. preferable that abuses are checked hy judicial rather than ad1ninistrativc procedures (ILO. 1975. pp. 21-'"').
In general then internal controls are acceptable so long as they do not undul) lin1it union activities. a point the Cornm i ttec of Experts seem to have peLi fica 11 y noted in connect ion" it h New Zealand ( ILO. 1973. pp. XO-Rl 
XI). The cornention does not. ho\\C\er. pro h i bit d is so 1 u t ion or u n ion s as such . o n 1) t h e n1 e l hod b) \\ h i c h t h i s is a c h i e' e d .
\~1 h i 1 e the Committee accepts dissolution under judicial control as it regards thi!) as pro,iding appropriate safeguards against ahusc (para. 157) and further accepts the notion of sequestration of union funds (para 171). it has dearly stated that an unfeltered Ministerial power lO order the Lancellation of the registration of a union i~ contrai) to the COil\Cntion (para. l(l1 ). Sould the ultimate sanction of deregistration (or dissolution) he retained then at k:1st 2 c h<1 nges are n e~d~d. The present unfettered 1n in istc ria I power n ceds to be rcpl aced\\ i th an appropri,lte judicial pnKcdure and L'onsequently dear critcrin need to be estahli~hed for justifying deregistrati<ll1.
Two con1 n1en ts can he made in rc h1 t iun to de r~gi st ration. The first is that lh c need fori t has not been clearly cstahlished ~tnd moreover the cnai1ahilit) or alternative procedure~ (particularly contcn1pt of courts) may well nutke it unnecessary. Seconc..H). it ~hould h~ recognised that deregistration is h) nature an anti-uninn procedure and docs not appl) to cn1ployer · in any rneaningful \\cty. Indeed the mere sugge tion of corn parable po\\ers <~imed at employers \\Ould result in a major howl of outrage.
Right To join federations
The decision in Auckland Freezing 11 1 orks JUOH 1 v. 1\'ew Zealand Free:ing JVorks IAOH' (1951) severely restricted the rights of unions to affiliate with larger union groupings. \Vhile legislation has amclior,tted this position. the position is still son1ewhat uncertain. Section ll.JX would still seem to lirnit international affiliations and po ·sihly affiliation with organisations whose objects exceeded those listed in section 19R. The Green Paper acknowledgL's this prohlern. which could he solved hy a str<tigtforward cllnendment to the present Ia\\ (Department of Lahou r. 19R5. I I p. 40 ).
Right to organise and collective bargaining. (Convention 98)
This convention. which was a<.Jopted in 1949. has 1 Jnain purposes: to protect the right to ?rgani e and to pron1ote collective bargaining. As convention 9R also deals\\ ith basiL rights it ss often closely associated with convention S7. The ILO Comrnittee of Expert ·. for example. in its surveys on frecdon1 of association has considered hoth conventions together (ILO. 1973 : lLO. 1975 ). This does not. however. mean that the"" arc interdependent and indeed the IL() Cornrnittee of Experts has specifically stated this in relation to a NL·w Zeldand lll'"lli11Cnt th~ll Convent ion ~R La n not be rat i lied because of its close I inks to Con \'Cnt ion S7 (I L()~l97 3. p. ~P ) . Gordon Anderson
The right to organise
This right is protected from 2 possible sources of abuse: discrimination against individual workers and attempts by employers to gain domination over unions. Article 1 provides that: ( l) Workers shall enjoy adequate protection against acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their employment. (2) Such protection shall apply more particularly in respect of acts calculated to:
a. make the employment of a worker subject to the condition that he shall not join a union or shall relinquish trade union membership; b. cause the dismissal of or otherwise prejudice a worker by reason of union membership or because of participation in union activities outside working hours or. with the consent of the employer. within working hours. Present New Zealand law gives some protection. explicitly in the victimisation provisions of section 150 and by implication in the personal grievance procedure.
Section 150 is not. however. as explicit as Article I and takes a fairly restrictive view of the form of action and range of persons who deserve protection. It seems to relate closely to victimisation in relation to activities within the conciliation and arbitration process rather than to anti-union discrimination. as such (see Szakats and Mulgan. 1985. p. 86) . Section 150 ( l) (a) is also somewhat ambiguous in that it seems that it may relate only to membership of a formative union rather than an established one.
It is suggested that section 150 could be amended by explicitly providing for the forms of discrimination in Article 1. It may also be that the remedies for dismissal need strengthening to ensure that a union activist cannot be .. paid orr· by compensation on dismissal by making· reinstatement mandatory in such cases. Such a provision would provide real protection for both the individual and the union. Some dismissal cases suggest that the Arbitration Court may not take fully into account the tensions that can arise in employer-unionist relationships. 10 The need for protection greater than compensation is recognised by the Committee (para. 215 -217) and has been acknowledged by the Committee of Experts:
In view of the difficulties which exist to ensure a total and absolute guarantee against acts of anti-union discrimination. in a certain number of countries legislation accords more extensive protection to trade union representatives. who are more usually exposed to acts of such a nature. This special protection is particularly desirable. because in orderto be able to perform their trade union duties in full independence. these representatives must have the guarantee that they will not be prejudiced. The guarantee of such protection is also necessary in order to ensure that effect is given to the principle that workers· organisations should have the right to elect their representatives in full freedom (ILO. 1973. pp. 64-65). Present New Zealand law is defective in regard to the protection of union representatives both in scope and in remedies. Article 2 provides: ( 1) Workers· and employers· organisations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts of interference by each other or each other·s agents or members in their establishment functioning or administration . (2) In particular. acts which are designed to promote the establishment of workers· organisations under the domination of employers· organisations. or to support workers· organisations by financial or other means. with the object of placing such organisations under the control of em players or employers· organisations. shall be deemed to constitute acts of interference within the meaning of this Article. New Zealand law does not seem to provide specific provisions that fulfil this article·s requirements (as the Committee seems in favour: para. 234) although in practice the system of union organisation probably ensures that such domination is unlikely. Nevertheless. specific protection is essential: particularly if there was any move towards smaller-enterprise based unions where such abuses are mostly likely. If the separate incorporation provisions suggested above were adopted. incorporation could be made subject to an independent certification of independence. In practical terms however. the size of the union. in particular the fact that it covers many employees and is financially independent. are probably the best safeguards. These features are retained in the most-representative provisions suggested above. •
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Collecti\'C! bargaining
The second lirnb of Convention 98 is found in Arti(le 4: 1\1ea,ures appropriate to national conditions shall he taken. \\here ncces:-,af) . to encountgc and promote the full development and utilisation of machiner) for \Oiuntary negotiation hctwecn cmpiO)'L'rs and employers· organisations and workers organisations . v. i th a' iew to the regulation of terms and conditions of ern ploymcnt by mean~ of collecti\ e agreements.
These convention~· requiren1ents seern directed rnore tov.ards ensuring the effecti\e implementation of freedon1 of association than \vith a particular n1ethod of industrial negotiation. The Australian system is. for exan1pk. rnentioned by the Con1111ittee of Experts (ILO. 1973. p. 72 ) without adverse comn1ent. Indeed it is noted that the ystcn1 includes a considerable an1ount ofvoluntary negotiation hath within and outside the fornHtl systcn1. As the New Zealand systen1 is an a logo us to that of Australia. and now no longer stipu latcs compulsOJ)' i.trhitration. it would seem that it is pritnafacie in confonnity with Article 4.
The Inajur concern of Article 4 appears to be that unions are recognised by employers and for the promotion of a bargaining system. In New Zealand. both issues arc dealt with by existing lav •. The conciliation and arbitration system both provides a bargaining systen1 and v~hik not compelling recognition rnakes it virtually certain .
Workers representatives (Convention 135)
According to its pre a n1ble. this convention is intended to su ppkn1en t the tern1s oft he antiunion discrimination aspects of Convention 9R with tenns in respect of \\Orkers representatives. It does so by 2 basic provisions. Article I provides:
\\'orkers· representati,es in the undertaking shall enjoy effective protection again~t an} act prejudicial to them. including di~missal base~..! on their status or activities a" a \\Orkers· representative or on union memhcrship or rwrticip<ttion in union activitie". in ~o far Hs the) 41Ct in conformit) \\ith cxi...,ting Ia\\~ or collccti\c agreements or other jointl) agreed a rra ngc men ts.
Article 2 then provides that representatives be provided with the facilities needed to perform their function:
(1) Such facilities in the undertaking hall be afforded to worker~· representatives as n1ay he appropriate in order to enable the1n to can)' out their functions pron1ptly and efficient}). (2) In this connection. account shall he taken oft he characteristics of the indu trial relations systen1 of the counti)' and the needs. size and capabilties of the undertaking concerned. (3) The granting of such facilities sha II not in1 pair the efficient operation of the undertaking concerned. \Vorkers· representatives includes union representative~ but also representative "freely elected .. by the workers in the undertaking and who:sc functions do not include activities "recognised as the exclusive prerogative of trade union ··(Article 3). As the latter categol)' is not found in New Zealand ~1t rresent. the provisions of Article 5 designed to ensure that such representatives do not unJenninc trade unions. i~ not relevant.
The New Zealand Govern mcn(s response to Convention 135 (AJ HR. 1973. Paper A7 A pp. 2-3) contains only one serious objection lo ratification which relates to Article 2. This is that present law does not provide for ··appropriate facilities" to be afforded. a terrn that is taken to include at lea . . J interviewing space. furniture and possibly corre pondence facilities. It is recognised that such facilities are often provided in praclice but it is argued that legislation would ··cut across accepted lines of rcsponsihiliti·. This argun1ent seen1s son1ewhat pedantic given the n1initnal nature of the facilities envisaged and the strong general tendency for legislative intervention in industrial relations. h is suggested that legislation to in1plen1ent Article 2 would be. at worst. a n1inirnal in1position on en1ploycrs and. in light of the con1n1ents on the tripartite nature of lLO conventions. should be welcon1ecl. This is particularly so if faci H tics areal ready widespread in practice. The .. faci 1 i ty .. of a union ·s access to its n1e1n hers is provided in section 96.
The Governn1ent"s con1n1ents suggest that set:tion 150 already covers the re4uiren1ents of convention does not preclude the openrtion of systen1s in which collective bargaining takes place within the fratnework of conciliation and arbitration.
Conclusion
A reviC\-'' of those international labour standards that relate to the Green Paper pro\eS to be a useful and salutory exercise. The conventions surveyed in this paper provide wh<tt the 11. .. 0 regards as basic 1ninirnum standards and safeguards for the operation of an industrial relations systen1. That New Zealand has yet to ratify any of these convention~ ~hould be seen as a 1natter of considerable concern. This paper has argued that. in the cases of Convention 98 . 135 and 154. there is no substantial barrier to ratification. There are areas where Ne\\ Zealand law and practice docs not confon11 to these convention but these arc 1ninor and could ea ily be remedied. The problen1s arc not ones of substance but cases where Ne"' Zealand law i inadequate and fails to tneet minin1un1 international standard .
If New Zealand takes its obligations to the ILO seriously. it should act to re1nedy these matters. The reasons governtnent give~ for not ratifying often seen1 to be excuses for inaction rather than reasoned ohjcctions to the principles of the conventions. It should he a funclion of governtnent to actively encourage ratification where possibk and to lead unions and employers tO\\arcls this goal. An impression is given. however. that I L<) nHtttcrs are not given a particularly high priority either by government or the other parties. The general revie\\' of industrial relations begun with the Green Paper is an opportunity to change these attitudes and to give proper weight to international standards. both con\cntions and recomtnendation .
The failure to ratify convention R7 i perhaps n1ore undcrstandahle as there are considerable technical and practical probktns to be overcon1e before conforn1it) could be guaranteed. It i suggested abo\'c that theke are not insurmountable and that the present revie\\ rnay well be the tin1e to face up to them . However. there al o is a trong po~sibilit) that the essential nature and purpose ofConvention 87 is neither appreciated or accepted. Its ba ic philosophy is that workers should be able to form and control their own organisation!) without interference. Legislation such as the Fishing Industry (Union Coverage) Act and suggestions of union restructuring to suit government and etnployer policies would scern to indicate clC(trly that this basic philusophy is yet lll be fully accepted in New zc,dand. COll1Jl11;!11tS that such conventions are aimed only at third world dictatorships. (IS have been made. arc at hcst arrogant and <:tt heart probably show a lack or syn1pathy for the Conventions purposes.
The ILO Corntnittee of Experts has staled (ILO. 1973. p. R3) that Conventions R7 and qg:
. .. hclong to the catego!) of fLO instruml!nh de!:ligned to promote and maintain certain fundamental human rights aimed at safeguarding man·s freedom. equal it) and dignit) . A':, ~.ouch. they figure among those Cotnention~ v.hich hcnc ohtaincd the largest numher of ratifications.
That New Zealand is not among this nurnher should he a 1nattcr of major concern for a country that prides itself on its liberal and dernocratic sy tc1n of governn1ent. ILO ( 1973) 
